Benadering van enkele klassieke filosofische kwesties vanuit een door de Angelsaksische taalfilosofie geïnspireerde visie op de zingevende rede.

The philosophy of Baruch Spinoza (1632-77) is an unusual,highly original, and influential reaction to the transition of Western cultureto the modern age. According to Spinoza, modern scientific thinking, if thoughtthrough, leads to a denial of humanity as the center of creation, willed by apersonal God. It is Spinoza who first formulated a philosophy which shows thatmodern scientific thinking, and the modern metaphysical view of humanity andthe world that it gives rise to, does not have to lead to despair. He understoodthat (...) engaging seriously in detached philosophical thinking could lead to anunexpected form of intellectual salvation. De Dijn's comprehensive introduction to Spinoza's philosophyis based on two key texts. He first provides an in-depth analysis of Spinoza's Treatise on the Improvement of theUnderstanding, which De Dijn characterizes as his introduction tophilosophy. This notoriously difficult text is here made accessible, even inits details. This analysis is followed by a comprehensive survey of Spinoza'smetaphysics as presented in his famous Ethics. De Dijn demonstrates howSpinoza's central philosophical project as introduced in the Treatise - thelinkage of knowledge and salvation - is perfectly realized in the Ethics. In thisway the unity of Spinoza's thought is shown to consist in his preoccupationwith the ethical question of salvation. The book also containsintroductory chapters on Spinoza's life and work, the original Latin text ofthe Treatise and its new English translation by Edwin Curley, and an annotatedbibliography on the secondary literature. (shrink)

Echte Freiheit läßt sich nach Leibniz nicht auf die Möglichkeit reduzieren, so zu handeln, wie man handeln will. Vielmehr muß echte Freiheit mit dem moralischen Verdienst in Verbindung gebracht werden. In diesem Zusammenhang erweist sich die Idee der logischen Kontingenz von besonderer Wichtigkeit. Eine Person hat kein moralisches Verdienst, wenn sie blindlings durch das Gute geleitet wird. Sie hat allein dann ein moralisches Verdienst, wenn sie das Schlechte zurückweist und bewußt das Gute wählt, das sich vom Schlechten abhebt. Insofern ist (...) derjenige, der moralisch richtig handelt, sich anderer Möglichkeiten bewußt. Leibniz trägt dieser Erfahrungstatsache durch den Gedanken Rechnung, daß eine freie Handlung logisch kontingent ist. Diesem Gedanken verleiht Leibniz einen metaphysischen Status: die möglichen Welten haben einen objektiven Gehalt. (shrink)

Religion and science are altogether too different to be rationally incompatible . If—as is done here—one defends such a thesis, one seems to sever the link between religion and truth. This link seems to many to be really essential: is not the highest requirement of a person, especially a religious person, „to live in the truth” ? And is it not necessary for rational beings to try and give a rational justification for one's religious beliefs? But perhaps „the truth” which (...) is of such importance to the religious person is not a theoretical truth; perhaps „to live in the truth” is not a matter of trying not to be fooled or of being prepared to change one's views according to new and better information. Furthermore, the desire for independent justification seems either incompatible with religious belief or rather pointless. The link between religion and truth can only be seriously discussed if one understands the relationship between religious beliefs and attitudes like truthfulness, trust, obedience to authority, etcetera. One objection to our position could be that it leads to a kind of „schizophrenic” split or disconnection between religion and the scientific outlook. To this objection we reply that since the arrival of science and technology human life is full of similar kinds of disconnection between non-scientific beliefs and attitudes, and scientific beliefs and technical approaches. To want to conserve science and technology and at the same time to want to restore the „Cosy Universe”-situation, is pure wishful thinking. (shrink)

Levinas' view on ethical commitment seems at first sight incompatible with the cultivation of particularistic ideals. The Other from whom the moral imperative originates, is also a Stranger: in submitting ourselves to his appeal, we obey a law radically transcending our autonomy. Therefore, our responsibility for the Other is not a loyalty based on personal sympathies, preferences or common interests. From Levinas' stern universalistic perspective, particularistic loyalty might appear as a form of moral self-indulgence. In this article we draw attention (...) to two forms of particularistic attachment which can paradoxically be seen as a confrontation with a radical moral heteronomy. The moral obligation imposed on us by nearness in space and relations of close kinship are in a sense arbitrary and contingent. Just because they are beyond rational justification, they also transcend the autonomy of our rational will. In this sense it seems to be true that some forms of particularistic commitment can make us aware of the radical heteronomy as it is meant by Levinas. (shrink)

Books and articles are written with titles like The Last Professors and The End of the University. Of course these headings should not be taken literally. What they indicate are deep changes in the nature of the university and in the understanding of what is a professor. They also demonstrate a profound malaise, especially - but not only-among academics in the Humanities. In this brief paper an attempt is made to understand what is happening. Universities have been changing from institutions (...) dedicated to specific "ends in themselves" into organizations geared towards the production of specific forms of outcome or product. Professors have become professionals in the service of such organizations. It is argued that these changes produce effects which pervert the internal aims of university teaching and research. They originate in a wider cultural, quasi-religious belief in mastery and control. (shrink)

The modern idea of the right to freedom of each human being can be briefly described as follows: it is the right to personal judgment in matters of what is true and good and to selfdetermination of one’s life and actions in view of this judgment. Today this right is considered as the most basic, or one of the most basic, unquestionable rights of the individual. At the same time, our present situation is characterized by an undeniable pluralism. We have (...) practically given up the hope that individuals, through their own judgment, will come to an agreement as to what are the central values in life, as to what is the good life. On the contrary, too much unity and agreement immediately raises the suspicion of more or less hidden constraint or indoctrination.In a pluralistic, free society, every defense of what is the good can only be seen as the defense of a particular conception of the good, which is potentially threatening for the self-determination of other individuals. The combination of the stress on freedom and the fact of pluralism, leads to an extreme importance being given to tolerance. Tolerance, together with the multiplicity of life-styles, seems to be something positive in itself. Within this perspective, the real question does not seem to be whether tolerance is something positive in itself, but whether it has any limitations. (shrink)

The professionalisation of care has resulted in ever increasing specialisation, use of technical innovations and informatisation. This has had consequences for the level and way of involvement of the care provider vis-à-vis the patient. The result has been growing alienation on the part of the patient and flight into non-classical medicine, as well as frustration on the part of medical personnel, likewise with respect to the reactions of patients.A solution is usually sought in more communication. This might be styled the (...) professional answer to alienation and frustration, whereby ‘the human factor’, it is hoped, can be better accounted for. Enhanced communication implies two elements: 1) to better cater for the feelings of patients by trained communicators, i.e. more openness, more client satisfaction; 2) to better take into account patient rights and to actually implement them.The question is whether measures in terms of communication, geared at enhancing client satisfaction and the implementation of patient rights, are the real answer to the above mentioned alienation and frustration. Perhaps the trouble has deeper reasons and requires taking other dimensions into account such as decency and human dignity, which cannot be captured simply in terms of satisfaction and rights.This would mean that the answer must be sought at a deeper level than communication. This level might be called ‘conversation’ . In the second part of the paper, the possible relationship between care and conversation will be briefly analysed. (shrink)

De blinde vlek in praktijk en discussie rond orgaandonatie In countries like Belgium and The Netherlands, there seems to be overwhelming public acceptance of transplantation and organ donation. Yet, paradoxically, part of the public refuses post-mortal donation of their own organs or of those of family members. It is customary within the transplantation context to accept the refusal of organ donation by family members “in order to accommodate their feelings”. I argue that this attitude does not take seriously what is (...) really behind the refusal of donation by (at least some) family members. My hypothesis is that even in very secularized societies, this refusal is determined by cultural-symbolic attitudes vis-à-vis the (dead) human body (and some of its parts). The blind spot for this reality, both in the practice of and discussions around organ donation, prevents understanding of what is producing the paradox mentioned. (shrink)

Critical Study of Daniel Dennetts Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon. Dennets book has a double aim. The first is to defend and advocate more scientific research in religion in the hope that this will induce scepticism into believers and perhaps turn them away from religion. The second is to survey existing theories about religion as a natural phenomenon and to propose a research programme for furthering scientific understanding of it. The anti-religious plea is rather tedious and probably (...) counterproductive. The status quaestionis of existing ‘theories’ is much more interesting and nuanced. Dennett even claims that human sciences such as sociology, anthropology and history will have to play an essential part in our understanding of religions and their development. Dennetts rather cognitivist interpretation of religion prevents him from pursuing some interesting ideas and comparisons concerning religion and other spheres of human interest. (shrink)

This paper comprises four moves at understanding trust. 1. By opposing it to pragmatic calculation and justification and linking it to a kind of „intrinsic” reasonableness present in relationships of trust; 2. By studying the implicit ontology of relationships of trust : trust involves a certain conception of world, self, others, time, etcetera; 3. By studying certain characteristics of trust like a certain unreflexive, spontaneous surrendering of oneself; 4. By studying trust as a specific personal relationship with essentially „embedded” or (...) „incarnated” meaning . In this context one can begin to understand the connection between trust on the one hand and loyalty or faithfulness on the other). (shrink)

Until recently the central problem seemed to be the relationship between Christianity and Modernity. According to many theologians and philosophers, modernity was considered not only as the result, but even as the final realisation of Christianity. In any case, Christianity was often understood as the religion which ends all traditional religiosity. The real antithesis then was not between Christianity and modernity, but between Christianity and tradition. The philosophical question raised here is whether any religion can survive except as a tradition (...) succeeding in preserving a certain range of ‘incarnated’ meanings which gives it its specificity. The present day interest in tradition is a remarkable fact. In our post-modern context, this interest betrays however an instrumental attitude vis-à-vis these meanings, thereby constituting a new threat to Christianity different from the modern threat. (shrink)

According to many scientists and philosophers, recent biotechnological discoveries and advances lead inescapably to the new, fundamental question: why consider the existing nature of man as untouchable, as sacred? Whereas the general public feels fear and outrage at the very thought of the creation of 'monsters', leading bioethicists find all this talk about the sacredness of human nature unacceptable or prejudiced. It is argued here that an answer to the question "is the existing human nature sacred?" cannot be given unless (...) another question is answered first: "why preserve our ethical way of life ?" In the remaining part of this paper, the desire to transcend existing human nature is understood by linking it to two different forms of dissatisfaction with the human way of life: it can find its origin either in the unwillingness to accept certain 'lotteries' producing all kinds of unequality among people, or in the desire to willingly lose oneself in a game of endless genetic experimentation. (shrink)

Introduction -- Sagesse et savoir théorique (Spinoza I) -- Naturalisme et religion révélée (Spinoza II) -- Un naturalisme ironique (Hume I) -- Théorie et pratique, et la pratique de la théorie (Spinoza et Hume) -- Science, sens commun et sagesse -- Science et religion -- Science et éthique -- Ethique et religion -- La fin de l'histoire -- Progrès et tradition.

La conception naturaliste de l'homme comme conatus n'est pas liee chez Spinoza a une conception ethique utilitariste, egoiste ou hedonique. Au contraire, et paradoxalement, elle est susceptible de s'accommoder d'une pensee ethique qui, a son stade le plus developpe, consiste en de tres hautes vertus et des sentiments religieux eleves. Ceci n'est possible que parce que le conatus est interprete comme capable d'une activite libre. Cette liberte est concue, non pas comme une realisation, par la volonte, de valeurs qui seduisent (...) sans necessitation, mais comme une activite emanant de maniere spontanee ou quasi-automatique d'une source autonome, c. a. d. non determinee par l'exterieur. (shrink)

In her recent book, Liberty of Conscience: In Defence of America’s Tradition of Religious Equality the influential philosopher Martha Nussbaum defends the American way of separation between politics and religion, as against the European ways. According to her interpretation this separation implies not only the prevention of unacceptable interference in religious matters, but also the affirmation of the equal dignity of religious differences. Although this position seems to be very favourable to religion, it is based on presuppositions that are very (...) questionable. Religion is defined by Nussbaum in a very narrow way as the individual’s quest for meaning and truth. Also, the understanding of what is required politically with respect to equal dignity is found to be inadequate. Equally debatable is her idea that there can be a freestanding ethical core in politics completely divorced from religious or non-religious moral values as embedded in culture. Nussbaum’s liberal conception of religion and of its place in contemporary politics is perhaps compatible with the American view of the separation between politics and religion. Whether Europeans should change their politics according to this conception is another matter. (shrink)

In his book Rede en religie: Een verkenning, Michiel Leezenberg discusses three aspects of religion: religion as a belief system, as it pertains to moral values and the experience of meaning, and as a practice. Concerning each of these aspects, he asks himself the question of the relation between religion and rationality. While touching on all three, this paper focuses on Leezenberg's treatment of the second aspect of religion. Although religion is of course a system of beliefs, these beliefs are (...) strongly embedded in specific practices, making a straightforward comparison with scientific beliefs highly problematic. The central problem discussed here is that of the relation between religious values and modern, secular values. The paper argues that the opposition is not simply between religious and secular morality, but between any morality in which moral taboos play an essential role and a certain utopianism present in secular morality. This leads to an investigation of the supposed link between religion and conservatism. The paper ends with a discussion of the recent phenomenon of the 'retour du religieux' in the form of a growing interest in religious experience via 'spirituality'. (shrink)